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PROTECTION OF NON-COMBATANTS IN GUERRILLA
WARS
JAMEs E. BoND*
One of the few beneficial consequences of war is law reform. It was
Henry Dunant, who, observing the battlefield horrors at Solferino in
1859, first proposed an international convention to protect the sick and
wounded.' Between 1864 and the First World War, members of the
international community agreed to a series of treaties formulating and
codifying the law of war.2 Experience in World War I proved these
rules inadequate, and in 1929 a new set of Geneva Conventions was
adopted.3 These in turn seemed inadequate to those who survived
* A.B., Wabash College, 1964; LL.B., Harvard University, 1967; LL.M., University
of Virginia, 1971. Instructor, International and Comparative Law Division, the Judge
Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. The views expressed in this
article are solely those of the author. They do not represent the opinions of The Judge
Advocate General, the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense.
1. During the fifteen hour battle 38,000 men were killed or wounded. J. DuNANT,
A MEMORY OF SOLFE1NO (1961). Two centuries earlier Jean Jacques Rousseau had
written in his Social Contract:
The object of war being the destruction of the enemy State, one has the
right to kill its defenders only when they have weapons in their hands; but
immediately they put them down and surrender, thus ceasing to be enemies
or agents of the enemy, they once more become ordinary men and one no
longer has any right to their life.
I J. Rouss.&u, Soc. CoNrRAcr 177 (Oxford U. Press ed. 1962).
2. E.g., The Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Soldiers Wounded
in Armed Forces in the Field of 1864, 22 Star. 940 (1883). T.S. No. 377; the 1899
Hague Conventions, 32 Star. 1779 (1903), T.S. No. 392; and the 1907 Hague Conven-
tions, of which the most important is Convention No. IV, Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, 36 Star. 2277 (1911), T.S. No. 403, and the Annex thereto
embodying Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land, 36 Star. 2295
(1911).
3. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July
27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021 (1933), T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343, like the Hague Relations
of 1907, has now become customary international law. Inter-war efforts to reduce the
incidences and ravages of war were not limited to work on these two conventions. InI
1925, all the major countries except Japan and the United States signed the Geneva
Gas Protocol, in III M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 1670 (1931), which for-
bids use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases." In 1928, the major powers agreed
to the Treaty for the Renunciation of War (sometimes called the Pact of Paris or the
Kellog-Briand Pact), 46 Star. 2343 (1931), T.S. No. 797. The new international organi-
zations also began promoting codification of the law of war, e.g., the 1924 Protocol
for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, in II M. HUDSON, INTErNATIONAL
LEGISlATION 1378 (1931), sponsored by the League of Nations.
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World War II, and in 1949 the four Geneva Conventions were signed.
In large part, they govern the treatment of non-combatants today.4
Recent guerrilla conflicts'-and, particularly, the Vietnam war-have
shown how gossamer-like the present protections are. Already one
hears the cries for reform,6 and it may be predicted that once the guns
have fallen silent men will again begin revising present laws to prevent
the all too frequent excesses which have characterized the war in South-
east Asia. The purpose of this article is twofold: first, some of the gaps
in Convention protections of non-combatants will be identified; and
second, possible remedies will be offered.
The alleged atrocities at My Lai have exposed one major gap in Con-
vention protection, although surprisingly few popular or scholarly com-
mentators have mentioned or discussed it.7 The Geneva Civilian Con-
vention does not protect the nationals of a co-belligerent state from the
depredations of an ally. Article 4, which defines "protected persons,"
4. The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S.
No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S 31 [hereinafter cited as GPW]; the Geneva Convention for
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter cited as GPW (Sea)]; the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter cited as POW]; and the Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 3 U.S.T.
3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The historical background of the 1949
Geneva Conventions is traced in G. DRAPER, THE RED CRoss CoNvENTIoNs (1958).
5. The phrase "guerrilla conflicts" may appear misleading or inaccurate. Technically,
guerrilla warfare refers to the type of military tactics employed rather than to the
nature of the conflict itself. Scholars have traditionally distinguished between interna-
tional and internal conflict, and within the latter more particularly between insurgency
and belligerency. Guerrilla tactics, although by no means new, are now pervasively
employed in all conflicts, tradition aside, and the law of war must be revised accordingly.
See generally D. BINDSCHLER-ROBERT, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 38-45 (1971).
6. In 1957 the International Committee of the Red Cross submitted to the XIXth
International Conference of the Red Cross a series of Draft Rules for the Limitation of
the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War. The ICRC has shown
great interest in the problems of non-combatants in non-international conflicts. It
has convened three private meetings of experts: Aid to Political Detainees (1953);
Applicability of Humanitarian Principles in Cases of Internal Disturbances (1955); and
Aid to Victims of Internal Disturbances (1962). See generally REPoRT OF rtE SECRE-
TARY-GENERAL, RESPECr FOR HumAN RIGHTS IN ARMED CoNFucr, U.N. Doc. A/8052
(1970).
7. Professor Rubin discusses the problem but blandly assumes arguendo "that the
substantive terms of the Civilian Convention apply to the inhabitants of My Lai to
protect them from the United States." Rubin, Legal Aspects of the My Lai Incident,
49 ORE. L. REv. 260, 264 (1970).
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provides that ". . . nationals of a co-belligerent State shall not be re-
garded as protected persons while the State of which they are nationals
has normal diplomatic representation in the State in whose hands they
are."
The draftsmen intended to protect only those persons of enemy na-
tionality living in the territory of a belligerent state and most inhabitants
of occupied territories. The peasants of My Lai can hardly be charac-
terized as living in occupied or belligerent territory; but even if they
were, the fact remains that these civilians are excluded from the protec-
tive ambit of the Civilian Convention because of their status as nationals
of a co-belligerent state. Ever Dr. Jean Pictet, although he speaks rather
carelessly of the "whole population" of occupied territories enjoying
a protected status, concludes that nationals of a co-belligerent state
receive no protection from the Convention.8
The draftsmen understandably did not see why such nationals needed
any protection. Soldiers do not usually pillage, rape, maim and murder
the nationals of their allies. Reflecting on their experience in World
War II, the delegates saw no reason to draft a law, for example, which
would have protected British nationals from American troops. Par-
ticularly, they saw no need to protect the nationals of an allied country
with whom their state maintained normal diplomatic relations. In such
circumstances-and it is difficult to imagine allies who do not maintain
normal diplomatic relations with each other 9-the state whose nationals
were aggrieved could be expected to press its claim through diplomatic
representatives under the traditional law of state responsibility. Israel's
prompt payment of full compensation for damages and loss of life re-
sulting from the accidental strafing of the U.S.S. Liberty during the June
War demonstrates that this remedy may be extremely effective.
In the context of guerrilla wars, however, the citizens of a co-bellig-
erent state may need protection. In the first place, they may be or appear
to be the "enemy." Indeed, some may be dubbed "sunshine patriots"
-loyal citizens by day but rebels during the hours of darkness. Under-
standably, the soldier who has reason to believe that a wide-eyed child
may be carrying a grenade, or who suspects that an old woman sitting
on the stoop makes bombs, does not think of these people as allied na-
tionals, let alone as innocent civilians, although most are. The difficulty
8. IV J. ThcTET, COMMENTARY, GENEVA CONVENTION 48-9 (1958). Pictet's four volume
commentary is the standard reference work on the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
9. Italy, when it joined the Allied side after Mussolini's fall, did not, however, have
"normal diplomatic representation" with its new co-belligerents.
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is that friend and foe look alike to the soldier, who, in the absence of
effective legal restraints, is not apt to ponder long their innocence or
guilt. After all, soldiers survive by getting the enemy before the enemy
gets him. Thus, in guerrilla wars the natural circumstances do not exist
which in more conventional conflicts would restrain the soldier from
attacking allied nationals. Moreover, civilians caught up in a guerrilla
war cannot always depend upon their government to intercede on
their behalf and insist upon their proper treatment by allied soldiers.
Many governments show little sympathy for the political and civil rights
of their citizens in peacetime and even less when they are attempting
to suppresss a rebellion. Under such circumstances, the government
usually imposes martial law."° One cannot discount the fact that certain
cultures place a lower value on human life than others. Likewise, the
host government may not wish to embarrass or offend an ally whose
money and men constitute its lifeline.
The gap in protection, however, may not be so large as it first ap-
pears. Article 3, which is common to all four Geneva Conventions,
broadly states that "persons taking no active part in the hostilities...
shall in all circumstances be treated humanely. . . ." The language
10. See J. KELLY & G. PELLETIER, LEGAL CoNTROL OF THE POPULACE iN SuBvERSiVE
WARFARE 31-287 (1966) for a review of state practice on fighting rebels in Algeria,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaya. Cf. Ford, Resistance Movements and
International Law, 7 INT'L REv. OF THE RED CROSS 579 (1967).
11. Article 3 has been called a "miniature convention" because it sets out a legal
regime for treatment of non-combatants in internal conflicts. It provides:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions;
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all
circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction
founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any
other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at
any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-
mentioned persons;
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, muti-
lation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and de-
grading treatment;
(d) passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court
[Vol. 12:787
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is sweeping and apparently embraces all non-combatants regardless of
their status as citizens of a co-belligerent. Article 3 applies, however,
only to "armed conflict not of an international nature." It would, there-
fore, give no protection to the co-belligerent citizens caught up in an
international conflict. Curiously enough, Article 3 was thought to
embody only certain minimum humanitarian principles extracted from
the broader coverage of the entire Conventions which apply to inter-
national conflicts.12 It did not occur to the draftsmen that Article 3
might provide greater protection than the whole of the Convention;
yet in the context of the problem we are discussing-protection of the
citizens of a co-belligerent-Article 3 extends protections not found
in the other provisions of the Convention.
It may be argued that even Article 3 was never intended to cover the
citizens of a co-belligerent because the latter would never be involved
in "a conflict not of an international nature." When one thinks of co-
belligerents in a war similar to the Second World War, which was the
paradigm in the minds of the draftsmen, that conclusion does follow.
Conventional wars are not, however, the model for present day con-
flicts. Moreover, there is no litmus paper test by which an internal
war can be distinguished from an international war. It is possible to
have an internal conflict in which foreign troops from a country friendly
to the government participate, but participation by foreign combat
troops in a conflict between internal groups competing for control does
not necessarily transform an internal conflict into an international one.13
In such a case Article 3 would protect the nationals of co-belligerents.
affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force,
by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the
present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal
status of the Parties to the conflict.
12. According to Pictet, the draftsmen had two alternatives. They could have ex-
tended all the Convention provisions to a narrowly defined range of internal conflcts
or they could select and apply a few humanitarian rules to a broader range of internal
conflicts. The Conference adopted the latter approach. IV J. Pncrir, supra note 8,
at 30-34.
13. The obvious examples are regional police actions in which the predominant area
power intervenes in an internal conflict to prevent a party it finds distasteful from
coming to power.
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Article 3 is not the only section of the Civilian Convention which
contains language sweeping enough to remove the distinctions set out
in Article 4. Article 13, which introduces Part II, General Protection
of Populations Against Certain Consequences of War, states: "The
provisions of Part II cover the whole of the populations of the countries
in conflict without any adverse distinction based, in particular, on race,
nationality, religion, or political opinion, and are intended to alleviate
the sufferings caused by war." Undoubtedly, the succeeding thirteen
articles, which comprise Part II, apply to the nationals of a co-belligerent.
As Pictet observes in his commentary: "The provisions in Part II...
apply not only to protected persons, i.e., to enemy or other aliens and
to neutrals, as defined in Article 4, but also to the belligerent's own na-
tionals; it is that which makes these provisions exceptional in charac-
ter . . . ." 14 Article 4 itself contains a clause which states that "the
provisions of Part II are.., wider in application .. ." than other Con-
vention provisions, limited as they are by the otherwise applicable
Article 4 definitions.
An analysis of Part II shows, however, that while the scope of its
application is wide, its substantive coverage is narrow. The majority
of the provisions deal with the establishment, operation, and protection
of hospital, safety, and neutral zones. Only Article 16 offers a solid
base upon which to build a legal argument for the protection of co-
belligerents.
The wounded and sick, as well as the infirm, and expectant
mothers, shall be the object of particular protection and respect.
As far as military considerations allow, each Party to the conflict
shall facilitate the steps taken to search for the killed and wounded,
to assist the shipwrecked and other persons exposed to grave
danger, and to protect them against pillage and ill-treatment.
There are two defects in this article, at least as a source of broad
protections for the citizens of a co-belligerent. The first is that it
enumerates those entitled to "protection and respect" and, as a conse-
quence, arguably excludes all others from its protection. The wounded
and sick, the infirm, and expectant mothers are not likely to constitute
the bulk of any civilian co-belligerent population. 15 Secondly, the phrase
14. IV J. PicrETr, supra note 8, at 118.
15. Pictet correctly observes in his Commentary "that the special respect due to
wounded, sick, and infirm persons and expectant mothers cannot be considered under
[Vol. 12:787
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"and other persons exposed to grave danger" is couched in a restrictive
context. Though the phrase could be interpreted to cover all of the
civilian population and thereby eliminate the exclusions implied in the
enumeration contained in the preceding paragraph, it is set out in a
section which does not impose an absolute obligation. The state need
act "only so far as military considerations allow," a reservation not
found in its predecessor articles in the first and second Geneva Con-
ventions, and one broad enough to swallow up the rule itself. Article
16, like Article 3, is too slender a thread with which to alleviate the
shortcomings of Article 4 in its failure to protect co-belligerent citizens.
Fortunately, today there is widespread agreement on the general
principle that "the protection of civilian populations is one of the es-
sential obligations of the parties" to any conflict.' 6 Of course, the dif-
ficulty is, as the President of the International Red Cross has pointed
out, to make the principle "fully operative" by developing it "in an
adequate instrument of international law." 17 There is also another
seldom recognized difficulty. In a guerrilla war there is no sharp dis-
tinction between those taking part in the hostilities and members of the
civilian population, and a convention which premises its provisions on
the viability of such a distinction will inevitably leave gaps of the kind
previously discussed. The challenge is to revise the law of war to insure
that all non-combatants, not just the citizens of a co-belligerent, are
henceforth protected. The problem of reform is especially pressing in
guerrilla conflicts which may also be characterized as internal wars
because only the general provisions of Article 3 presently apply to such
struggles.
Several fundamental problems are not unique to international con-
flicts. Even in guerrilla wars, for example, one must continue to dis-
tinguish between what a soldier can do to the enemy firing an AK-47
at him, and what he can do to an old man plowing a rice paddy. The
customary distinction between combatants and non-combatants remains
valid because it is functional: it defines the attitude and the action of
one party to the other at the moment of contact. For instance, if
any circumstances or in any manner whatsoever to free the belligerents from their
obligation to give the civilian population as a whole the respect and protection to
which they are entitled." !d. at 135. But he neglects to discuss what respect and
protection a co-belligerent must accord the remainder of the civilian population.
16. Resolution I adopted by the Institute of International Law at the Session at Edin-
burgh, Institute of International Law 1-3 (1969).
17. Gonard, Protection of Civilian Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate
Warfare, 7 INT'L REV. OF Tm RE CRoss 301 (1967).
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"Charlie" is firing at an American soldier, he's a combatant; if he's
waving a white flag, he's a non-combatant. The cruel battlefield reality
of self-defense and survival dictates that a soldier act differently toward
a combatant than toward a non-combatant. But no reason requires
that the soldier initially treat one non-combatant differently from an-
other. The non-combatant poses no immediate threat. He has sur-
rendered or is offering no resistance or, to use the quaint language of
the Geneva Conventions, is in "the hands of" the soldier. What action
the soldier may take against a non-combatant during the conduct of
military operations should depend on a balancing of military necessity
against the human rights of the individual-and not be dependent upon
an individual's status as a citizen, enemy alien, guerrilla sympathizer, or
loyal supporter.
These differences are relevant in determining the subsequent treat-
ment to which the non-combatant is entitled. A government fighting for
its survival may legitimately distinguish between those among its citizens
who support it and those who oppose it by according civil and political
rights.18 It may punish the latter swiftly and severely, so long as it does
so in accordance with minimum legal standards of justice. It may intern
them, confiscate their property, and deprive them of their right to vote.
It may, as all governments do, try, convict, and jail or execute those who
violate its laws. Even in peacetime, governments distinguish between
citizens and aliens; a fortiori, a government may greatly curtail the
civil and political rights of aliens in wartime. But while governments
may accord different types of non-combatants different civil and po-
litical rights, they cannot authorize their soldiers to accord different
treatment to different categories of non-combatants during the conduct
of tactical military operations.
In the first place, the category into which the non-combatant fits
usually is not readily apparent. Peasants, for example, do not wear
placards identifying themselves as "VC sympathizers" or "government
supporters." To repeat a point made earlier, they look discouragingly
alike. In such circumstances, classification becomes a complex political-
18. Note 9 supra. One need not completely subscribe to the thesis that democracy
is the child of peace and cannot survive apart from its mother to believe that nations
may take extraordinary measures to insure their survival during war. We would do
well to remember that it was Mr. Lincoln who established the first modern precedent
for suspending democratic guarantees during a civil war. And before criticizing such
Vietnamese programs as pacification and relocation, we should reflect upon what we
believed to be the necessity of relocating our citizens of Japanese descent during World
War 1T.
[Vol. 12:787
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legal judgment, which the average soldier is ill-equipped to make. Quite
aside from the fact that he is not trained to interrogate or classify, he
will rarely have the time to question extensively; nor will he have access
to other information which would enable him to evaluate responses ac-
curately. The soldier will have accomplished his mission if he re-
linquishes the non-combatant to qualified officials for proper classifica-
tion.' 9 International law, then, if it is to be responsive to the realities
of modern day guerrilla conflicts, must provide uniform rules for the
treatment of all non-combatants during the conduct of military opera-
tions, and it must provide rules for the non-combatants' subsequent
classification and treatment.
The first objective poses fewer difficulties since there is wide agree-
ment on two principles. First, non-combatants should be spared, as
much as possible, the sufferings of war, and, secondly, the launching
of attacks against them should be prohibited.20 Spelling out these
principles in detail is no easy task (and is beyond the scope of the
present article), but the major pit-fall has been the failure of interna-
tional conventions to insure their application to all non-combatants,
19. The necessity of evacuating all captured personnel to the rear for classification
is a basic point stressed in all army instructional programs. The recently revised
Army Subject Schedule 27-1, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Hague Conven-
tion No. IV of 1907, states that "[clombat soldiers do not determine the status of any
captured person. All persons captured or detained should be evacuated to the detainee
collecting point where proper authorities can classify them."
20. [T]he United Nations itself-and, consequently, the member states-has
repeatedly expressed the idea that the civilian population is not a lawful
objective. Three important resolutions must be mentioned here: Resolu-
tion 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961 on the legality of the use of nuclear
weapons, which in its preamble deduces the illegality of these weapons
from the prohibition against unnecessary human suffering and from the
fact that these weapons cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to
mankind; Resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966 on chemical and
bacteriological weapons (the question of the Geneva Protocol), which
states in its preamble that weapons of mass destruction are "incompatible
with the accepted norms of civilisation" and asserts "that the strict ob-
servance of the rules of international law on the conduct of warfare is in
the interest of maintaining these standards of civilisation"; and finally,
Resolution 2444 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968 with respect to human
rights in armed conflicts, which "adopts as its own" resolution XXVTII
adopted by the XXth Conference of the Red Cross (Vienna, 1965) and
which reiterates the following principles: the choice of means for injuring
the enemy is not unlimited, attacks against the civilian population as such
are prohibited, and a distinction must be made at all times between com-
batants and the civilian population....
D. BINDscEDLER-ROBERT, supra note 5, at 19.
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wherever situated. This defect could be remedied by adding a para-
graph to common Article 3 specifying:
These minimum standards of humanity must also be observed in
armed conflicts of an international nature, and those taking no
active part in the hostilities shall enjoy these protections except
where other provisions of the Conventions or international law
provide greater protection.
There are several advantages to this remedial approach. The most
practical advantage should be the acceptability of the proposal to most
nations. Nations are naturally cautious about accepting limitations on
their sovereignty. The suggested revision does not impose new re-
straints on their right to deal with citizens and others; instead it extends
already existing protections to all those similarly situated. By incorpo-
rating a body of law already agreed upon, one avoids arguing anew the
question of how parties engaged in armed conflict should treat non-com-
batants. Moreover, the Article 3 limitations do not preclude effective
government action against dissident groups, the chief reason the Article
was originally accepted. Although hardly self-defining, the Article
strikes an equitable balance between the right of a government to main-
tain its own existence and the human rights of its citizens, including
those who violently oppose it.
The second objective-to provide rules for the classification and sub-
sequent treatment of non-combatants-represents a far more difficult
problem. Article 3 places all non-combatants into the one category,
"persons taking no active part in the hostilities." Such a broad classi-
fication is sufficient for determining their rights during the conduct
of military operations; but it does not provide any guidance for de-
termining who among them may be interned, tried, punished, or freed,
nor does it specify procedures for making such determinations.
Taken together, the Geneva Conventions do establish a classification
scheme that determines the status and rights of the individual. A prisoner
of war, for example, does not enjoy all the rights -of a retained person.
Generally, however, these different statuses reflect the differences one
would expect among participants in a conventional war. For example,
the belief that an individual is either a member of the military or a
member of the civilian population is a major premise. Also, the con-
ception of how an army looks, smells, and acts reflects traditional ideas.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in POW Convention, Article 4,
[Vol. 12:787
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which also illustrates the irrelevance of the present Geneva classifications
to guerrilla warfare. Basically, Article 4 defines a prisoner of war as a
member of a national armed force or any other group that fulfills the
following four conditions:
(a) is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) has a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) carries arms openly;
(d) conducts operations in accordance with the laws and cus-
toms of war.
No guerrilla is likely to qualify for POW status under such conditions.
While the guerrilla force will probably have a hierarchical command,
its members are not likely to wear a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance," nor will they always bear arms openly. The final re-
quirement, that they conduct their operations in accordance with the
law of war, is a curious one. Desirable as it might be for all parties
to a conflict to obey the laws and customs of war,2' why should one's
failure to do so affect his status or even his subsequent treatment (other
than the severity of punishment should he be prosecuted for violating
the law of war)? In our criminal law a man charged with the most
reprehensible crime is still submitted to the reasoned judgment of the
law. Article 3 imposes an absolute obligation on the government to
treat all non-combatants humanely, regardless of whether they adhere
to its provisions.22
The absurdity of the last of the four conditions is not the chief point
at issue, however. What is at issue is the irrelevance of the whole class-
ification scheme to guerrilla conflicts. Participants in these wars simply
do not fall into the neat categories set out in the Geneva Conventions.
Into what categories do they fall? A classification scheme must be
chosen which reflects the functional necessity and wisdom of treating
one kind of participant differently from another.
21. The theoretical difficulty of making international law binding on guerrillas and
other insurgent groups is explored in Note, The Geneva Conventions and the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 HAiv. L. REv. 851 (1967). Among recent
rebel groups, only the Algerians claimed to follow the law of war. The Viet Cong,
for example, rejected the idea that it was bound "by the international treaties to which
others besides itself subscribed." 5 INTL REv. OF THE RED CROss 636 (1965).
,22. III J. PRraT, CoMmENTARY 35 (1958); Draper, The Geneva Conventions of 1949,
114 HAGUE RE UEIL DES Couas 59, 96 (1965). But see Levie, Maltreatment of Pisoners
of War in Vietnam, 48 BosToN U. L. Rxv. 324 (1968).
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The little-known classification procedures presently used by Allied
forces in Vietnam provide a good starting point for discussion of alter-
native schemes. 2  Generally, the aim in Vietnam is to separate those
23. ANNEX A-MIUTARY AssIsr.TcE COMMAND, ViETNAm DiRE rIvE 381-46, MILITARY
INTFLLIGENCE COARnE-D SCREENING OF DErA wNFs, (Dec. 27, 1967):
CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION AND DISPOSITION OF DE-
TAINEES
1. PURPOSE. To establish criteria for the classification of detainees which
will facilitate rapid, precise screening, and proper disposition of detainees.
2. DEFINITIONS.
a. Detainees. Persons 'who have been detained but 'whose final status has
not yet been determined. Such persons are entitled to hunane treatment
in accordance 'with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions.
b. Classification. The systematic assignment of a detainee in either the
PW or Non-Prisoner of War category.
c. Prisoners of War. All detainees 'who qualify in accordance with para-
graph 4a, below.
d. Non-Prisoners of War. All detainees who qualify in accordance
with paragraph 4b, below.
3. CATEGORIES OF FORCES.
a. Viet Cong (VC) Main Force (MF). Those VC military units which
are directly subordinate to Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN),
a Front, Viet Cong military region, or sub-region. Many of the VC units
contain NVA personnel.
b. Viet Cong (VC) Local Force (LF). Those VC military units which
are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and
which normally operate only within a specific VC province or district.
c. North Vietnanese Army (NVA) Unit. A unit formed, trained and
designated by North Vietnam as an NVA unit, and composed completely
or primarily of North Vietnamese.
d. Irregulars. Organized forces composed of guerilla, self-defense, and
secret self-defense elements subordinate to village and hamlet level VC
organizations. These forces perform a wide variety of missions in support
of VC activities, and provide a training and mobilization base for maneuver
and combat support forces.
(1) Guerrillas. Full-time forces organized into squads and platoons
which do not necessarily remain in their home village or hamlet. Typical
missions for guerrillas include propaganda, protection of village party com-
mittees, terrorist, and sabotage activities.
(2) Self-Defense Force. A VC paramilitary structure responsible for
the defense of hamlet and village in VC controlled areas. These forces do
not have their home area, and they perform their duties on a part-time
basis. Duties consist of constructing fortifications, serving as hamlet guards,
and defending home areas.
(3) Secret Self-Defense Force. A clandestine VC organization which
performs the same general function in Government of Vietnam (GVN)
controlled areas. Their operations involve intelligence collection, as well
as sabotage and propaganda activities.
4. CLASSIFICATION OF DETAINEES.
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foreign soldiers and domestic citizens who have taken up arms against
the government from all others. The former are treated as POW's,
although many cannot meet the Geneva Convention criteria for the
POW status. "All others" are further subdivided into three groups:
civil defendants, returnees, and innocent civilians. Those classified as
innocent civilians are promptly released and returned to their homes.
Returnees, those previously disaffected who now agree to support the
a. Detainees will be classified PW's when determined to be qualified under
one of the following categories:
(1) A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3a, b, or c,
above.
(2) A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3d, above, who
is captured while actually engaging in combat or a belligerent act under
arms, other than an act of terrorism, sabotage, or spying.
(3) A member of one of the units listed in paragraph 3d, above, who
admits or for whom there is proof of his having participated or engaged
in combat or a belligerent act under arms other than an act of terrorism,
sabotage, or spying.
b. Detainees will be classified as Non-Prisoners of War when determined
to be one of the following categories:
(1) Civil Defendants.
(a) A detainee who is not entitled to PW status but is subject
to trial by GVN for offenses against GVN law.
(b) A detainee who is a member of one of the units listed in
paragraph 3d, above, and who was detained while not engaged in actual
combat or a belligerent act under arms, and there is no proof that the
detainee ever participated in actual combat or belligerent act under arms.
(c) A detainee who is suspected of being a spy, saboteur or
terrorist.
(2) Returnees (Hoi Chanh). All persons regardless of past member-
ship in any of the units listed in paragraph 3, above, who voluntarily sub-
mit to GVN control.
(3) Innocent Civilians. Persons not members of any units listed in
paragraph 3, above, and not suspected of being civil defendants.
5. DISPOSITION OF CLASSIFIED DETAINEES.
a. Detainees who have been classified will be processed as follows:
(1) US captured PW's and those PW's turned over to the US by
FWMAF will be retained in US Military channels until transferred to the
ARVN PW Camp.
(2) Non-Prisoners of War who are suspected as civil defendants will
be released to the appropriate GVN civil authorities.
(3) Non-Prisoners of War who qualify as returnees will be transferred
to the appropriate Chieu Hoi Center.
(4) Non-Prisoners of War determined to be innocent civilians will be
released and returned to the place of capture.
b. Responsibilities and procedures for evacuation and accounting for
PW's are prescribed in MACV Directive 190-3 and USARV Regulation
190-2.
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government, are sent to Chieu Hoi centers where they are rehabilitated.
Finally, civil defendants are prosecuted in the local Vietnamese courts
for whatever crimes they allegedly have committed.
These categories reflect a balance between governmental needs and
individual rights. The government has an obvious interest in separating
innocent civilians caught in its nets and returning them to their homes.
On the other hand, a brief detention and interrogation, while an incon-
venience to the citizen, is not an unreasonable infringement of his rights.
It is difficult to see how the government could ascertain the status of the
non-combatant with less interference.
At the other extreme, it is easy to understand why foreign soldiers are
treated as POW's. They, of all participants in guerrilla conflicts, fit
most neatly into the regular Geneva Convention categories. Arguably,
while the government could treat them as spies and saboteurs, policy
reasons dictate extending POW status to them. Trying and executing
foreign nationals unnecessarily inflames passions and may frustrate the
possibility of a negotiated settlement. Thus, the North Vietnamese
government, for example, prudently dropped its plans to try American
airmen as war criminals when the United States and other countries
raised strenuous protests.
The reasonableness of classifying a country's own nationals as POW's
is less obvious. In most cases those who have taken up arms against their
government will have violated its criminal laws and, therefore, could be
tried as common criminals. Most states have adopted such a policy,
particularly in the initial stages of insurgency.2 4 There is, however, one
advantage to treating captured rebels as POW'S: a POW may be in-
terned for the duration of the conflict. An individual tried in a civil
court must be released after serving his sentence, and he may then
return to the streets or countryside to continue the revolution.2 5 Con-
versely, treating all rebel citizens as POW's would arguably preclude
efforts like the Chieu Hoi program, since participation in such a pro-
gram might constitute a renunciation of rights by the prisoner of war
which is not permitted by the Geneva Convention. 6 As long as the
24. Note 9 supra.
25. Consequently, the South Vietnamese review all defendants immediately prior to
their release and may extend their confinement. T. Mien, Vietnam: National Security
Needs in a Constitutional Government, Feb. 5, 1971 (unpublished thesis, The Judge
Advocate General's School) at 16. This procedure, which may strike some as extra-
ordinary and only justified in wartime, is apparently standard practice in Portugal.
Cf. Changes are Urged in British Prisons, New York Times, Feb. 7, 1971, at 3, col. 4.
26. Article 7 of the GPW Convention provides that "[pirisoners of war may in no
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government is dealing with its own citizens rather than with POW's,
the Chieu Hoi program may be defended as an act of amnesty or par-
don, powers traditionally held by all governments.
The government should be permitted discretion in choosing between
these alternate methods of handling its dissident citizens, so long as it
treats all of them humanely. It cannot be scored for enforcing its
criminal laws against those it calls citizens. The citizen-turned-rebel
can little complain if his former government takes him at his word,
accepts his renunciation of allegiance, and treats him as it would a
foreign enemy. Furthermore, there is no reason why the government
must treat all citizens either as POW's or as civil defendants, so long as
it uses a rational basis for distinguishing those it subjects to the normal
criminal process from those it interns as POW's. It is important that
the government retain its flexibility in dealing with rebels; yet it is also
essential that it act within the law. ". . . [A] firm yet flexible system
of law is required so as to permit the government to act effectively to
meet this threat while at the same time establishing limits and protections
for the nationals of the country to insure their individual rights." 27
Thus, the Conventions should require that the government treat all
foreign soldiers as POW's, whether the conflict be internal or interna-
tional. Further, the Conventions should obligate any government which
elects to treat its own citizens as POW's to make status determinations
before a civil, military, or mixed judicial body. In such a hearing the
individual should have the right to appear and contest the government's
determination. The decision to deprive a citizen of his right to trial
in a regularly constituted court and to confine him without a judicial
determination of guilt for an indefinite period is so extraordinary that
it should only be made by a judicial forum.
Again, allied practice in Vietnam is instructive. When the status of
a detainee is doubtful, his case is referred to a tribunal28 which consists
circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the present
Conventions, and by the special agreements referred to in the foregoing Article, if
such there be." Since Article 118 specifies that "prisoners of war shall be released and
repatriated", one could argue that a Chieu Hoi program violated the obligation to
repatriate. Pictet offers an interesting, if inconclusive, discussion of the legislative
history of Article 118 and the Korean experience with the repatriation problem in his
Commentary, GPW Conventions 541-49 (1960).
27. Kelly & Pelletier, Legal Control of Populations in Subversive Warfare, 5 VA.
J. Ir'L L. 174 (1965).
28. The United States and South Vietnam are obligated by their view that the con-
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of three or more officers who, where practicable, should be judge ad-
vocates or other military lawyers familiar with the Hague and Geneva
Conventions.29 An army directive establishes very specific procedures
for the hearings."0 It specifies, for instance, that the individual has a
right to an interpreter and to counsel who may be present at all open
sessions of the court.31 Counsel must be informed of the tribunal pro-
cedures and be given free access to his client. He can call, examine, and
cross-examine witnesses.32 While the tribunal is not bound by the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice rules of evidence, it must follow specified
procedures33 to insure that the defendant has his day in court. While
it is not necessary-and would probably be unwise-to set out in the
Conventions such a detailed tribunal procedure, it should be required
that the classification decision be made before a judicial tribunal. While
its procedures would probably differ from those for trial of defendants
in regular courts, outlined below, the minimum standards discussed
therein would be applicable to tribunal decisions as well.
Provisions requiring classification of non-combatants, similar to those
we have discussed, should be added to the present Geneva Conventions.
While countries may voluntarily adopt classification schemes, such as
the United States and her allies have done, nothing in international law
presently insures their adoption. Moreover, a state may adopt a classi-
fication scheme considerably less rational and just than minimum stand-
ards of humanity would dictate. While sovereign states should retain
considerable discretion in dealing with their domestic and foreign ene-
mies, international law must circumscribe their exercise of an otherwise
unfettered discretion.
This is particularly true in the areas of detention, trial, and punish-
ment of those rebels the government seeks to prosecute in its regular
courts. Article 3 prohibits "[t]he passing of sentences and the carry-
ing out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which
flict is an international one to which all the Geneva Conventions apply to determine
the status of persons before "a competent tribunal." Article 5, GPW Convention.
Nothing in Article 3, if it alone were applicable, requires a government to submit
doubtful cases of status to any tribunal. This is a major gap in Convention protection.
29. Inspections and Investigations of Prisoners of War-Determination of Eligibility,
MACV Dir. 20-5, (March 15, 1968).






are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples." Some may find
this an adequate standard for the conduct of trials, but the phrase "all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples" is unnecessarily vague. Today, there is a consensus that certain
specific rights are fundamental. Among these are prompt notice of
charges, adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense, right to coun-
sel, and the assistance of an interpreter. This list of rights appears in
such diverse agreements as the GPW Convention, the Civilian Conven-
tion, and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.3 4 The right to a speedy trial and the right
to appeal are also important although they are less universally conceded.
These specific rights should be enumerated within the appropriate
section of Article 3 as examples of judicial guarantees. Retaining the
general phrase allows the expansion of these rights as the international
consensus on "judicial guarantees" evolves, while listing the specific
rights insures present adherence to minimum standards of justice.
Article 3 does not specifically advert to the problems of detention
and punishment, however; although it does impose the general require-
ment of humane treatment. It is desirable to spell out in some detail the
means by which the general principle of humanity requires a state to
detain and punish those prosecuted in civilian courts. The recently pub-
licized conditions in the South Vietnamese prison on Con Son Island
illustrate the timeliness of this problem. If the press descriptions of
the "tiger cages" were accurate, the conditions there violated humanity's
fundamental sense of fairness and justice.
It is easier to deplore the occasional outrage than to suggest appropriate
minimum standards. One cannot impose unrealistically high standards.
Outside of Western Europe and the United States, prison facilities are
generally poor, and even in those countries they are often inadequate.
One can hardly expect a small, underdeveloped country whose govern-
34. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. It may not be entirely accurate to suggest that
this recital of parallel provisions validates the proposition that all these rights should
be extended to defendants in emergency situations. Article 15 of the European Con-
vention, for example, explicitly states that "[iln time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures
derogating from its obligations under this Convention ... ." Under the Article 15 ex-
ception, the European Court of Human Rights has upheld detention without trial by
the Republic of Ireland in its suppression of the outlawed Irish Republic Army. "Law-
less" Case, Europ. Court of Human Rights (1961), 4 YB. EuRnop. CoNVENTION ON Hu-
MAN RIGHTs 438, 474.
35. House Panel Urges US. to Investigate "Tiger Cage" Cells, New York Times,
July 14, 1970, at 1, col. 7.
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ment is fighting for its existence to devote a substantial amount of its
precious resources to building and maintaining model penal colonies.
Nevertheless humanity may demand that it house prisoners in facilities
which are sanitary and afford protection to the prisoners from the ele-
ments. Furthermore, a requirement may be established that the prison-
ers be served an adequate minimum diet. Finally, the Conventions should
require that males and females be housed separately, and that all receive
periodic medical examinations and basic medical care when needed.
These are indeed minimum standards, but they do not go nearly as
far as the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention. Moreover, the standards
are general ones, and while that may permit the rationalization of in-
adequate treatment which could be precluded by more detailed pro-
visions, the broad language allows the continual raising of the standards
as the conscience of mankind demands and the expanding resources of
the nation permits. The basic protections we have suggested will prohibit
the most reprehensible treatment of prisoners while providing a sound
basis for the expansion of their rights. It is imperative that the Conven-
tions obligate the parties to permit neutral inspection of detention and
prison facilities. The bright light of publicity, which pressured the
Vietnamese government into rectifying conditions at Con Son, cannot
illuminate areas hidden from public view.
Future historians are not likely to characterize ours as the Age of
Aquarius-"when peace will guide the planets and love shall steer the
stars." However much we may yearn for universal peace, the past 4000
years of history justify Plato's observation that only the dead have seen
the last of war. But we can, like civilized men in all ages, seek to pre-
serve and strengthen those qualities of reason and charity which led
Camus to conclude that in times of pestilence we learn that there is
more to praise in men than to despise. Strengthening the protections
extended non-combatants in guerrilla wars is an act of reason and
charity in a time of pestilence.
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